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Abstract
Background: The “obesity paradox” has been reported in several observational
studies, where obesity was shown to be associated to a decreased mortality in indi-
viduals suffering from a chronic disease, such as diabetes or heart failure. Causal argu-
ments have recently been given to explain this apparently paradoxical fact: because the
chronic disease is caused by obesity, the observed “protective effect” of obesity among
patients with, say, diabetes, actually has no causal value. Recently, Sperrin et al.1 re-
launched the debate and claimed that the resulting bias, the so-called collider bias, was
unlikely to be the main explanation for the obesity paradox. However, a number of
issues in their work make their conclusions questionable.
Methods : We first study the bias between (i) the association between obesity and
early death among patients suffering from the chronic disease ∆AS and (ii) the causal
effect considered by Sperrin et al.. Under the usual framework of structural causal
models, we explain why this bias can be much higher than what these authors reported.
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We further consider alternative causal effects of potential interest and study their dif-
ference with ∆AS . Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the magnitude of
these differences under realistic scenarios.
Results : We show that it is possible to have a negative ∆AS , while the causal effects
we considered are all positive.
Conclusion: Even under the very simple generative model we considered, collider
bias can be the sole cause of the “obesity paradox”.
2
1 Introduction
The “obesity paradox” has been reported in several observational studies, where obe-
sity was shown to be associated to a decreased mortality in individuals suffering from
a chronic disease, such as diabetes2 or heart failure3. Some biological explanations
have been put forward, but causal arguments have recently been given to explain this
apparently paradoxical fact4: because the chronic disease is on a causal path between
obesity and mortality, conditioning on the value of this mediator can create spurious
association, or bias. And the observed “protective effect” of obesity among patients
with, say, diabetes, actually has no causal value.
Recently, Sperrin et al.1 relaunch the debate and claim that the resulting bias, the
so-called collider bias, is unlikely to be the main explanation for the obesity paradox.
However, we believe there are a number of issues in Sperrin et al.’s article which make
the authors’ conclusions questionable. We further believe that a thorough description
of these issues can be instructive for epidemiologists interested in causal inference.
Sperrin et al. based their arguments on a simple form of the causal model under-
lying the obesity paradox; see Figure 1. The four random variables A, M , Y and
U are binary variables, e.g. corresponding to obesity, diabetes, early death and some
(potentially unobserved) binary confounder, respectively. For simplicity, the authors
first consider effects and associations defined on the additive scale. In particular, the
association between A and Y given M = 1 is
∆AS = E[Y |M = 1, A = 1]− E[Y |M = 1, A = 0].
This quantity can be estimated from data collected from patients with diabetes (M =
1), even ifU is unobserved. As mentioned above, several observational studies reported
negative estimates for ∆AS , leading to the obesity paradox. However, ∆AS has to be
related to a meaningful causal effect for the paradox to be real. Sperrin et al. then study
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the bias between ∆AS and the causal effect of A on Y conditioned on M = 1, which
they define as
∆CE = E[Y
A=1|M = 1]− E[Y A=0|M = 1].
Here, Y A=1 and Y A=0 are two counterfactual variables or potential outcomes, that
one would have been able to observe in the counterfactual worlds ΩA=1 and ΩA=0 that
would have followed the intervention do(A = 1) and do(A = 0), respectively5. See
Section 6.1 for the precise definitions of Y A=a, a ∈ {0, 1}, under the model of Figure
1. A first remark is that there is no unique and well-defined intervention do(A = 1)
or do(A = 0) when A represents obesity. As nicely put forwarded in6, this makes
causal inference about obesity a particularly difficult task, because assumptions such
as consistency, positivity and exchangeability are unlikely to hold6. Here we ignore
this problem just as Sperrin et al. did: we assume the existence of such an intervention
and proceed as usual under structural causal models7,8.
Along their derivation, it seems that Sperrin et al. assume that Y A=a is independent
of A given M = 1 whereas this is generally not the case under the model of Figure 1,
because M is a descendant of A. Then, they obtain an incorrect expression for ∆CE
and the true bias ∆CE − ∆AS is generally much larger than what they report; see
Section 2 below. As will be shown in Section 4, many configurations of the simple
generative model considered by Sperrin et al. lead to an "observed protective effect"
of obesity among diabetic patients (∆AS < 0) while the causal effect ∆CE > 0 is
positive. Stated another way, (∆AS < 0) does not imply (∆CE < 0) under the model
considered by Sperrin et al.: if the expression “obesity paradox” is intended to mean
that the causal effect of obesity on early death, among the patients with chronic disease
in the actual world, is negative, ∆CE < 0, then there is no way to conclude that this
obesity paradox is real from studies reporting a negative value for (an estimate of)
∆AS , because of collider bias.
In other respect, the premise that we are interested in ∆CE is questionable. Indeed,
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Figure 1: The DAG considered in1
A YM
U
∆CE relies on the “cross-world” quantities E[Y A=a|M = 1] and its interpretation
is not straightforward (see Section 2.2). Because M is a mediator here, alternative
causal effects of interest can be found in the literature dealing with mediation analysis.
Denoting by Y A=a,M=m the outcome variable we would have been able to observe
in the counterfactual world Ωa,m that would have followed the double intervention
do(A = a,M = m), the controlled direct effect at M = 1 is defined as ∆CDE =
E[Y A=1,M=1]−E[Y A=0,M=1]. Conditional versions of ∆CDE can be considered as
well (see Section 3). We show that the bias (∆CDE − ∆AS) is typically lower than
(∆CE − ∆AS), and is close to what Sperrin et al. incorrectly described as the bias
(∆CE − ∆AS). This suggests that if the obesity paradox means that the controlled
direct effet ∆CDE is negative, then Sperrin et al.’s discussion, when applied to the bias
between the estimable quantity ∆AS and the target quantity ∆CDE , is mostly valid.
In Section 4, we present numerical results obtained under the same data generation
mechanism as Sperrin et al., but we eventually consider additional interaction terms.
For some particular configurations, we obtain ∆AS < 0 and ∆CDE > 0. Therefore, a
negative ∆AS implies neither a negative ∆CE nor a negative ∆CDE and collider bias
can fully explain the “apparent paradox”.
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2 Identifiability of ∆CE and study of ∆CE −∆AS
2.1 General presentation
Recall the definition ∆CE = E[Y A=1|M = 1] − E[Y A=0|M = 1]. Because it relies
on counterfactual variables, Sperrin et al. tried to express it in terms of the observed
variables A,M,U and Y . But, they incorrectly establish that ∆CE = ∆Sp, with ∆Sp
defined as:
∑
u
{E[Y |M = m,A = 1, U = u]− E[Y |M = m,A = 0, U = u]}P [U = u|M = m].
On the left column of Page 526, the authors especially write
E[Y A=a|M = m] =
∑
u
E[Y A=a|M = m,U = u]P [U = u|M = m]
=
∑
u
E[Y |M = m,A = a, U = u]P [U = u|M = m]. (1)
But Equality (1) is only guaranteed ifE[Y A=a|M = m,U = u] = E[Y |M = m,A =
a, U = u] which, on turn, is only guaranteed if Y A=a ⊥ A | (M,U). However, this
conditional independence does generally not hold under the model depicted in Figure
1 because M is a descendant of A and, then, the set {M,U} does not satisfy the back-
door criterion; see5,9. See also Fine point 7.2 in8 where the authors use the SWIG
approach10 in a related causal model. As a result, ∆Sp is generally different from
∆CE under the causal model of Figure 1.
As a matter of fact, ∆CE can not be expressed in terms of the distribution of the
variables (A,M,U, Y ) without further assumptions on the causal model. In Section 4
below, we consider a generative model that is consistent with that considered by Sperrin
et al. By specifying the structural functions fY , fM , fA and fU and the distributions of
the disturbances εY , εA, εM and εU in this model, an analytic formula for ∆CE can
be derived (see Section 6.2). Then, we show that the difference between the true value
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Figure 2: A simplified version of the DAG considered in Sperrin et al., corresponding
to the special case of no confounder and no direct effect of A on Y .
A YM
of ∆CE and ∆Sp, as well as the bias ∆CE −∆AS , can be sensible, which invalidates
Sperrin et al.’s conclusions.
2.2 Additional remarks
The quantity ∆CE = P [Y A=1 = 1|M = 1] − P [Y A=0 = 1|M = 1] has to be
interpreted with caution. Denote by MA=a the counterfactual variable pertaining to
the chronic disease that we would be have been able to observe in the counterfac-
tual world ΩA=a. Further introduce Y a,m = Y A=a,M=m the counterfactual out-
come variable that we would have observed in the counterfactual world Ωa,m that
would have followed the double intervention do(A = a,M = m). Observe that
Y A=a = Y A=a,M
A=a
(see Section 6.1 for more details), and then that P [Y A=a =
1|M = 1] = P [Y A=a,MA=a = 1|M = 1]. In particular, P [Y A=0 = 1|M = 1] =
P [Y A=0,M
A=0
= 1|M = 1] is the risk of early death in ΩA=0, for the individuals with
diabetes in the actual world. But M = 1; MA=0 = 1: some diabetic patients in the
actual world would not have been diabetic in ΩA=0. As a result, a positive ∆CE , for
instance, can be solely due to the fact that a portion of the individuals with diabetes in
the actual world would not have suffered from diabetes in ΩA=0 and would have lived
longer in ΩA=0 than they would have in ΩA=1. In other words, even if it is conditioned
on M = 1, ∆CE is not related to the direct effect of A on Y . It is the total effect of
A among a subgroup of the population defined according to a variable observed in the
actual world, just as the average causal effect on the treatedE[Y A=1−Y A=0|A = 1] is
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a measure of the total effect of A on another subgroup of the population. In particular,
even if A has no direct effect on Y , that is if its effect is entirely mediated through M ,
∆CE is generally non-null, contrary to what Sperrin et al. wrote on the right column
of Page 526. More precisely, they consider the case where βA = βAM = 0 under
their generative model, which corresponds to a situation where A has no direct effect
on Y . Then, they claim that P [Y A=1 = 1|M = 1] = P [Y A=0 = 1|M = 1], so that
∆CE = 0. As explained above, this is generally false (see Figure 3 in Section 4 for an
illustration).
Considering in more details the simple model where U is absent from the DAG and
A has no direct effect is instructive ; see Figure 2. In this DAG, the empty set satisfies
the back-door criterion and, then, Y A=a ⊥ A. As a result, P [Y A=a = 1] = P [Y =
1|A = a], and the average total effect is generally non-null, as expected:
P [Y A=1 = 1]− P [Y A=0 = 1] = P [Y = 1|A = 1]− P [Y = 1|A = 0] 6= 0. (2)
More precisely, this total effect is always non-null except in the absence of either the
arrow pointing from A to M or the arrow pointing from M to Y . Next, we have
Y ⊥ A|M so that P [Y = 1|A = 1,M = 1] = P [Y = 1|A = 0,M = 1] and
∆AS = 0. As will be made clearer in Section 3, this implies that the controlled direct
effect ∆CDE is null, as expected too. However, because {M} does not satisfy the
back-door criterion, Y A=a ⊥ A|M generally does not hold and P [Y A=a = 1|M = 1]
generally differs from P [Y = 1|A = a,M = 1] (and ∆CE is generally non-null).
Under this simple model, the fact that Y A=a ⊥6 A|M can also be shown by a simple
reduction to absurdity argument. First recall that the consistency assumption (A =
a ⇒ Y = Y A=a) holds under the structural causal models considered throughout this
article (see Section 6.1). Then, if Y A=a was independent of A given M , we would get
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the following chain of equalities:
P [Y A=a = 1] =
∑
m
P [Y A=a = 1|M = m]P [M = m] by the tower rule
=
∑
m
P [Y A=a|M = m,A = a]P [M = m] if Y A=a ⊥ A|M
=
∑
m
P [Y = 1|M = m,A = a]P [M = m] by consistency
=
∑
m
P [Y = 1|M = m]P [M = m], because Y ⊥ A|M
= P [Y = 1] by the tower rule.
Therefore, the assumption Y A=a ⊥ A|M = 1 yields P [Y A=1 = 1] − P [Y A=0 =
1] = P [Y = 1]− P [Y = 1] = 0, which contradicts Equation (2) . This completes our
reduction to absurdity argument and establishes that Y A=a ⊥ A|M = 1 is generally
false under the model of Figure 2.
In our chain of equalities above, the fact that P [Y A=a = 1] =
∑
m P [Y
A=a =
1|M = m]P [M = m] follows from the tower rule, that is E(Z) = E[E(Z|X)] for
"any" couple of random variables X and Z. Even if Y A=a is not observed, we may
recall that it is still a random variable in the usual sense. Indeed, the counterfactual
variables and observed variables are random variables and are all defined on a common
probability space as deterministic functions of the exogenous variables εA, εM and
εY ; see Section 6.1 below as well as Sections 4 and 5 in7 and Section 3.4 in9 for
instance. As a result, standard probability calculus, among which the tower rule, apply
on counterfactual variables too.
Lastly, using the SWIG approach10 for instance, it is easy to show that A ⊥
(MA=a, Y A=a) and, then, Y A=a ⊥ A|MA=a under the model of Figure 2; see Sec-
tion 6.1. Then, successively applying the facts that A = a ⇒ (Y = Y A=a and
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M = MA=a) and Y A=a ⊥ A|MA=a, it follows that
P (Y = 1|A = a,M = 1) = P [Y A=a = 1|A = a,MA=a = 1]
= P [Y A=a = 1|MA=a = 1].
This is another way to establish that, generally, P (Y = 1|A = a,M = 1) 6=
P [Y A=a = 1|M = 1] in the model of Figure 2. Indeed, the random sets {MA=a = 1}
and {M = 1} are generally different and so are quantities P [Y A=a = 1|MA=a = 1]
and P [Y A=a = 1|M = 1]. For instance, {MA=0 = 1} consists of the individuals who
would have suffered from diabetes in the counterfactual world ΩA=0, while {M = 1}
consists of the individuals with diabetes in the actual world, among whom some are
obese and others are not. If obesity causes diabetes it is clear that {MA=1 = 1} 6=
{MA=0 = 1} and then that {M = 1} differs from {MA=a = 1}, for a ∈ {0, 1}. See
Section 6.1 for more details on the difference between the random sets {MA=a = 1}
and {M = 1}.
3 Controlled direct causal effects
As mentioned above, ∆CE has to be interpreted with caution and is not related to the
direct effect of A. In the presence of a mediator like M here, alternative causal effects
have been advocated11,12. In particular, the control direct effect captures the effect of
A, while fixing the value of the mediator (e.g. to 1), and is therefore appealing in the
context of the obesity paradox. The three following quantities can be considered:
∆CDE = P [Y
1,1 = 1]− P [Y 0,1 = 1]
∆CDE|M=1 = P [Y 1,1 = 1|M = 1]− P [Y 0,1 = 1|M = 1]
∆CDE|A=1,M=1 = P [Y 1,1 = 1|A = 1,M = 1]− P [Y 0,1 = 1|A = 1,M = 1].
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The first one, ∆CDE , is the controlled direct effect of A on Y , at M = 111,12. It com-
pares the risk of death in counterfactual worlds Ω1,1 and Ω0,1, that would have followed
the double interventions do(A = 1,M = 1) and do(A = 0,M = 1), respectively. All
individuals suffer from diabetes in these two counterfactual worlds, but they are all
obese in Ω1,1, while none of them is obese in Ω0,1. Therefore, ∆CDE captures the
direct causal effect of obesity, while controlling for the diabetic status (= 1 here). The
other two quantities are conditional versions of ∆CDE . More precisely, ∆CDE|M=1
corresponds to ∆CDE when focusing on individuals who suffer from diabetes in the
actual world, while ∆CDE|M=1,A=1 focuses on individuals who are obese and suffer
from diabetes in the actual world.
Under the structural causal model corresponding to Figure 1, both ∆CDE and
∆CDE|A=1,M=1 can be identified from the distribution of (A,M,U, Y ). Moreover,
the corresponding formulas exhibit similarities with both ∆AS and ∆Sp. Because
there is no unobserved confounder between A and Y (except U , potentially), we have
Y a,m⊥ A|U .12 Similarly, because there is no unobserved confounder (except, potien-
tially, U ) between M and Y , we have and Y a,m ⊥ M |(A,U).12 Therefore,
P [Y a,m = 1] =
∑
u
P [Y a,m = 1|U = u]P [U = u] by the tower rule
=
∑
u
P [Y a,m = 1|A = a, U = u]P [U = u] because Y a,m ⊥ A|U
=
∑
u
P [Y a,m = 1|A = a,M = m,U = u]P [U = u] because Y a,m ⊥ M |(A,U)
=
∑
u
P [Y = 1|A = a,M = m,U = u]P [U = u] by consistency.
Then, ∆CDE can be written
∆CDE =
∑
u
{P [Y = 1|A = 1,M = 1, U = u]−P [Y = 1|A = 0,M = 1, U = u]P (U = u)}.
This expression ensures that ∆CDE = 0 in the model depicted in Figure 2.
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Now, turning our attention to ∆CDE|A=1,M=1, we have
P [Y a,m = 1|A = a∗,M = m∗]
=
∑
u
P [Y a,m = 1|A = a∗,M = m∗, U = u]P (U = u|A = a∗,M = m∗) by the tower rule
=
∑
u
P [Y a,m = 1|A = a∗, U = u]P (U = u|A = a∗,M = m∗) because Y a,m ⊥ M |(A,U)
=
∑
u
P [Y a,m = 1|A = a, U = u]P (U = u|A = a∗,M = m∗) because Y a,m ⊥ A|U
=
∑
u
P [Y a,m = 1|A = a,M = m,U = u]P (U = u|A = a∗,M = m∗) because Y a,m ⊥ M |(A,U)
=
∑
u
P [Y = 1|A = a,M = m,U = u]P (U = u|A = a∗,M = m∗) by consistency.
Therefore,
∆CDE|A=1,M=1 =
∑
u
{P [Y = 1|A = 1,M = 1, U = u]
− P [Y = 1|A = 0,M = 1, U = u]}P (U = u|A = 1,M = 1).
Turning our attention back on ∆AS , observe that it writes
∑
u
{P [Y = 1|A = 1,M = 1, U = u]P (U = u|A = 1,M = 1)
−P [Y = 1|A = 0,M = 1, U = u]P (U = u|A = 0,M = 1)}.
Sperrin et al. claim that the difference between ∆AS and ∆CE is possible be-
cause P (U = u|A = a,M = m) generally differs from P (U = u|M = m).
As we showed in Section 2 above, their claim is only valid for the difference be-
tween ∆AS and ∆Sp, and the difference between ∆AS and ∆CE is also due to the
discrepancy between P (Y = 1|A = a,M = 1) and P [Y A=a|M = 1]. From
the formula above, Sperrin et al.’s discussion is actually valid for the difference be-
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tween ∆AS , ∆Sp, ∆CDE and ∆CDE|A=1,M=1. Indeed, the only differences be-
tween these four quantities lie in the version of the U -distribution used to marginal-
ize the quantities P [Y = 1|A = a,M = 1, U = u] over u, for a ∈ {0, 1}. It is
P (U = u|A = a,M = 1) for ∆AS , P (U = uM = 1) for ∆Sp, P (U = u) for
∆CDE and P (U = u|M = 1, A = 1) for ∆CDE|A=1,M=1. Despite these similarities,
these four quantities are generally different since M typically depends on both A and
U under the model of Figure 1. Moreover, our numerical results show that it is possible
to have ∆AS < 0 while ∆CDE > 0 and ∆CDE|A=1,M=1 > 0 (see Section 4), con-
tradicting Sperrin et al.’s conclusion (even when applied to the controlled direct effets
instead of the ∆CE).
Way may further mention that quantities ∆CDE|M=1 and ∆Sp are generally dif-
ferent. These two quantities would be equal if Y a,m ⊥ A|(M,U), but this conditional
independence does usually not hold under the model of Figure 1. More generally, we
were not able to relate ∆Sp to any meaningful causal effect under this model.
A final remark is that ∆CDE|M=1 can not be identified from the distribution of
(A,M,U, Y ) under the model of Figure 1 without further assumptions. It may be
identifiable after specifying the generating functions and the disturbances distributions
following the same arguments as those used in the case of ∆CE (see Section 6.2).
4 Numerical illustration
We now provide a few numerical examples illustrating the differences between the
various quantities introduced above. Our objective is to show that a negative ∆AS is
not necessarily “paradoxical”: more precisely, it does not imply either ∆CE < 0 or
∆CDE < 0 or ∆CDE|A=1,M=1 < 0.
13
4.1 Data generation mechanism
We consider a generative model that can be seen as a special case of, and is then
consistent with, the one described by1. More precisely, our data generation mechanism
is obtained by specifying the structural functions fY , fM , fA and fU as well as the
distributions of the disturbances εY , εM , εA and εU , which together lead to the same
relationships between Y , A, M and U as those considered in Sperrin et al. Keep in
mind that we had to specify the causal model in order to derive an analytic formula for
∆CE (see Section 6.2).
Denote by 1I[·] the indicator function. Define four independent random variables
εA, εU , εM and εY distributed according to a uniform distribution over the interval
[0, 1]. For any given (pA, pU ) ∈ (0, 1)2, define A = 1I[εA ≤ pA] and U = 1I[εU ≤ pU ]
so that A ∼ B(pA) and U ∼ B(pU ) are two independent Bernoulli variables ; as in
Sperrin et al.’s work, we consider the special case where pA = pU = 0.5. Now, in-
troduce the sigmoid function expit(x) = (1+exp(−x))−1, and set, for any (a, u,m) ∈
{0, 1}3 and for some real parametersα0, αA, αU , αAU , β0, βA, βU , βM , βAM , βAU , βUM
and βAUM ,
pM (a, u) = expit(α0 + αAa+ αUu+ αAUau)
pY (a,m, u) = expit(β0 + βAa+ βUu+ βMm+ βAUau+
βAMam+ βUMum+ βAUMaum).
Finally, variables M and Y are defined as
M = fM (A,U, εM ) = 1I[εM ≤ pM (A,U)],
Y = fY (A,M,U, εY ) = 1I[εY ≤ pY (A,M,U)].
Sperrin et al. only considered situations where interaction terms in the Y -model
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were all null: βAM = βAU = βUM = βAUM = 0. We will show below that con-
clusions can be quite different when considering non-zero values for these parameters,
especially when comparing ∆AS and ∆CDE or ∆CDE|A=1,M=1. Moreover, following
Sperrin et al., we set
α0 = −1
2
(
αA + αU +
1
2
αAU
)
β0 = −1
2
(
βA + βM + βU +
1
2
(βAM + βAU + βUM ) +
1
4
βAUM − ν
)
for some ν ≥ 0. Sperrin et al. choose ν = 0, which ensures that the overall preva-
lence of Y is about 0.5. Here, results will be presented for this particular choice too.
However, we shall add that the proportion of configurations for which ∆AS is negative
while the causal measures ∆CE , ∆CDE and ∆CDE|A=1,M=1 are positive vary with
ν (a configuration standing for a particular choice for the other parameters involved in
our generative model, αA, αU , αAU , βA, βU , βM , βAM , βAU , βUM and βAUM ).
Lastly, to be consistent with Sperrin et al.’s article, we compute measures of asso-
ciation and causal effects on the odds-ratio scale, rather than on the difference scale.
We will denote the corresponding quantities by ORAS , ORSp, ORCE , ORCDE and
ORCDE|A=1,M=1. For instance,
ORAS =
P (Y = 1|A = 1,M = 1)/P (Y = 0|A = 1,M = 1)
P (Y = 1|A = 0,M = 1)/P (Y = 0|A = 0,M = 1)
ORCE =
P [Y A=1 = 1|M = 1]/P [Y A=1 = 0|M = 1]
P [Y A=0 = 1|M = 1]/P [Y A=0 = 0|M = 1]
ORCDE =
P [Y 1,1 = 1]/P [Y 1,1 = 0]
P [Y 0,1 = 1]/P [Y 0,1 = 0]
ORCDE|A=1,M=1 =
P [Y 1,1 = 1|A = 1,M = 1]/P [Y 1,1 = 0|A = 1,M = 1]
P [Y 0,1 = 1|A = 1,M = 1]/P [Y 0,1 = 0|A = 1,M = 1] ·
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4.2 Results
We first consider the setting corresponding to Figure 2 of Sperrin et al., where βA =
βAM = βAU = βUM = βAUM = 0 and βM = 0 (top row of Figure 3). We obtain the
exact same results as Sperrin et al. Indeed, this setting corresponds to the case whereA
has neither a direct nor an indirect effet, and causal odds-ratios ORCE , ORCDE and
ORCDE|A=1,M=1 all equal 1. This is one particular situation where Y A=a ⊥ A|M
as mentioned in Section 2.2 above, and therefore ORSp = ORCE (=1). On the other
hand, ORAS is generally not equal to 1, but the difference with the other quantities is
typically small.
According to Sperrin al., βM can be set to 0 without loss of generality. The bottom
row of Figure 3 shows that it is not the case. Indeed, when βM 6= 0, ORCE is typically
different from 1, as mentioned in Section 2.2. On the other hand, the quantity ORSp
still equals 1, and so do ORCDE and ORCDE|A=1,M=1. As for ORAS , it behaves as
in the case where βM = 0. This particular case illustrates the discrepancy between the
true value of ORCE and the quantity ORSp studied by Sperrin et al. It further shows
that if ∆CE is the target quantity, then ORAS can be severely biased and, then, that
Sperrin et al.’s conclusion is false. In particular when αA > 2, ORAS is sensibly lower
than 1 while ORCE is sensibly greater than 1 (when the other parameters are set to
their default values).
However, if the target quantity is ORCDE (or ORCDE|A=1,M=1) the bias attached
to ORAS is less sensible under the configurations presented on Figure 3. We present
results under configurations where αA = αU = βA = βUM = 2, βU = 3 and
βAM = −2. In each panel of Figure 4 one of the four remaining parameters, αAU ,
βM , βAU and βAUM , varies between −3 and 3, while the other three are fixed at 1.
Overall, under these configurations, ORAS is sensibly inferior to 1 while ORCDE ,
ORCDE|A=1,M=1 and ORCE are all sensibly superior to 1.
To recap, our numerical results establish that a negative association between A and
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Figure 3: Causal and “observable”odds-ratios in the case where βA = βAM = βAU =
βUM = βAUM = 0, with βM set to either 0 (top row) or 1 (bottom row), and for
varying values of the other parameters αA, αU , βU and αAU . In each panel, along
the x axis, one of these parameters is varied from −3 to 3 (left panel: αA, mid-left
panel: αU , mid-right panel: βU , right panel: αAU ), and the other parameters are set to
a default value (1 for αA, αU , βU and 0 for αAU ).
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Y , when restricting our attention to patients with M = 1 (ORAS < 1) does not imply
either ORCE < 1, or ORCDE < 1 or ORCDE|A=1,M=1 < 1. Therefore, even under
the simple generative model considered by Sperrin et al., the “obesity paradox” can be
artifactual and fully due to collider bias.
5 Discussion
Obesity is widely considered as a cause of early death. With the notations used in this
article, this means that the causal odds-ratio,
[P (Y A=1 = 1)/P (Y A=1 = 0)]/[P (Y A=0 = 1)/P (Y A=0 = 0)],
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Figure 4: Causal and “observable”odds-ratios in the case where αA = αU = 2 =
βA = βUM = 2, βU = 3 and βAM = −2, for varying values of the other parameters
αAU , βM , βAU and βAUM . In each panel, along the x axis, one of these parameters is
varied from −3 to 3 (left panel: αAU , mid-left panel: βM , mid-right panel: βAU , right
panel: βAUM ) and the other parameters are set to the default value 1.
αAU βM βAU βAUM
1
2
3
−2 0 2 −2 0 2 −2 0 2 −2 0 2
AS CDE CDE|A=1,M=1 CE Sp
is superior to 1. However, several observational studies reported an observed odds-
ratio among individuals with diabetes or heart failure2,3,13 less than one, suggesting
that ORAS < 1. This observation could indeed be considered as paradoxical if the ob-
served odds-ratio among individuals with chronic disease was a consistent estimate
of ORCE . However, this is not the case because M is a descendent of A, as al-
ready suggested in the literature4. Contrary to what Sperrin et al. reported1, we
show that this difference between ORAS and ORCE can be important even under
the simple causal model they considered. In addition, we show that ORAS , ORCDE
and ORCDE|A=1,M=1 share some similarities, but are still different. In particular,
by considering additional interaction terms in the generative model proposed by Sper-
rin et al., we exhibited configurations where ORAS < 1 while ORCDE > 1 and
ORCDE|A=1,M=1 > 1 (and ORCE > 1). Therefore, estimates of ORAS should be
regarded with caution since they can not be related to any meaningful causal effects.
Furthermore, the confounder U has to be observed in order to estimate the causal quan-
tities ORCDE and ORCDE|A=1,M=1. As for ORCE , it can not be identified from the
distribution of (A,M,U, Y ) without further assumptions on the causal model.
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We shall add that even if we could estimate ORCDE and ORCE , these quantities
might not be appropriate to answer the question of whether weight loss would be ben-
eficial for an obese patient with diabetes or heart failure13. The risk of early death
for such a patient is P (Y = 1|A = 1,M = 1) = P (Y A=1 = 1|A = 1,M = 1),
by consistency. But what would be his risk after a weight loss? If it can be assumed
that his risk would be the one he would have had in the counterfactual world ΩA=0
(that is, his risk had he never been obese), then it is simply P (Y A=0|A = 1,M = 1).
Because P (Y A=0 = 1|A = 1,M = 1) = P (A=0,M=MA=0= 1|A = 1,M = 1),
it is noteworthy that this assumption implies that this patient might be cured of dia-
betes after his weight loss. Under this assumption, the quantity of interest is therefore
P (Y = 1|A = 1,M = 1) − P (Y A=0 = 1|A = 1,M = 1) = P (Y A=1 = 1|A =
1,M = 1)−P (Y A=0 = 1|A = 1,M = 1). It is related to ∆CE , but also to the excess
fraction and, under some assumptions, to the attributable fraction and the probability
of disablement5,7. However, if weight loss is unlikely to cure this patient of diabetes,
his risk after a weight loss might rather be P [Y A=0,M=1 = 1|A = 1,M = 1]. Then,
the quantity of interest would be P (Y = 1|A = 1,M = 1)− P [Y A=0,M=1 = 1|A =
1,M = 1] = P (Y A=1,M=1 = 1|A = 1,M = 1) − P (Y A=0,M=1 = 1|A = 1,M =
1) = ∆CDE|A=1,M=1.
Lastly, because there is no unique and well-defined intervention resulting in weight
loss (or weight gain), causal inference on observational data is a particularly com-
plicated task when dealing with obesity6. As a matter of fact, to answer the ques-
tion whether weight loss would be beneficial for obese patients with diabetes, a safer
roadmap would be first specifying the envisaged intervention(s) which might result in
weight loss, and then planning a randomized interventional study.
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6 Technical details
6.1 A brief introduction to structural causal models
6.1.1 The causal model of Figure 1
We refer to5,8,10 for a thorough introduction of causal models and counterfactuals.
Here, the fundamental concepts are illustrated in the particular case of the model con-
sidered in1. Figure 1 represents the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) attached to this
causal model. In this DAG, only the endogenous variables U,A,M, Y are represented,
while the corresponding exogenous variables (or disturbances) εU , εA, εM and εY are
not. The relationships between the endogenous variables can be fully described by
the set of structural equations corresponding to this DAG. There is one such equation
for each endogenous variable involved in the DAG. It involves a fixed (but unknown)
autonomous function, whose inputs are the parents of the variable, along with its asso-
ciated exogenous variable. In our example, the set of structural equations is

A = fA(εA)
U = fU (εU )
M = fM (A,U, εM )
Y = fY (A,M,U, εY ),
where, fA, fU , fM and fY are the unspecified autonomous functions. In this article,
we assume that the exogenous variables (or disturbances) are mutually independent.
The structural equations are further helpful to precisely define the variables we
would have been able to observe had we intervened to fix the value(s) of some vari-
able(s). In particular, in the counterfactual world ΩA=a that would have followed the
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intervention do(A = a)5,7,9, we would have been able to observe the variables

U = fU (εU )
M (a) = fM (a, U, εM )
Y (a) = fY (a,M
A=a, U, εY ).
From these equations, it is clear that consistency holds since, if A = a, then M =
fM (a, U, εM ) = M
A=a and Y = fY (a,M,U, εY ) = fY (a,MA=a, U, εY ) = Y A=a.
Variables we would have been able to observe in the counterfactual world Ωa,m
that would have followed the double intervention do(A = a,M = m) can be defined
too: 
U = fU (εU )
Y (a,m) = fY (a,m,U, εY ).
From these definitions, we have Y A=a = Y A=a,M
A=a
as mentioned in Section
2.2. Here Y A=a,M
A=a
can be thought of as the outcome we would have been able to
observe in the counterfactual world that would have followed the intervention A = a
and M = MA=a, that is the counterfactual world where A would have been set to
a and M would have been set to whatever values it can get under the distribution of
MA=a; of course this counterfactual world is exactly ΩA=a.
Moreover, the distribution of the exogenous variables (εA, εM , εU , εY ) induce well-
defined probabilities of events such as {Y A=a = 0} ∩ {Y = 1} or {Y A=0 = 0} ∩
{M = 1} ∩ {A = 1}, etc. See Section 3.4 in9. In particular, the quantity P (Y A=a =
1|M = 1), which appears in ∆CE , is well-defined and be computed in closed form
once we specify the distribution of the disturbances and the form of the structural func-
tions fY and fM ; see Section 6.2 below for an example.
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Figure 5: The SWIT resulting from the intervention do(A = a) in the simplified causal
model of Figure 2.
A a Y A=aMA=a
6.1.2 The causal model of Figure 2
We conclude this brief introduction by inspecting the simplified causal model of Figure
2. In this case, A is not a parent of Y , and there is no confounder. Then, the set of
structural equations becomes

A = fA(εA)
M = fM (A, εM )
Y = fY (M, εY ).
Accordingly, the counterfactual variables Y A=a,MA=a and Y a,m are defined as

MA=a = fM (a, εM )
Y A=a = fY (M
A=a, εY )
Y (a,m) = fY (m, εY ).
This simplified setting corresponds to that considered in Figure 10 in10. Figure 5
presents the SWIT corresponding to the intervention do(A = a)10. From this repre-
sentation, it directly follows that A ⊥ (Y A=a,MA=a), and therefore that Y A=a ⊥
A|MA=a; see Section 3.5.3 in10. Then, and as mentioned in Section 3.6.1 in10, the
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following holds
IP(Y = 1|M = 1, A = a) = IP(Y A=a|MA=a = 1),
which is generally different from IP(Y A=a|M = 1).
To better understand why IP(Y A=a|MA=a = 1) 6= IP(Y A=a|M = 1), it is con-
venient to take a concrete example and compare the (random) sets {MA=a = 1} and
{M = 1}. For instance, consider the generative model described in Section 4.1, where
we set βA = βU = αU = 0 and βAM = βAU = βAUM = βUM = αAU = αUM = 0
to ensure that there is no arrow pointing from A to Y and no confounder U . Then,
we have {MA=0} = {εM ≤ expit(α0)}, so that P (MA=0 = 1) = expit(α0), and
{MA=1} = {εM ≤ expit(α0 + αA)}, so that P (MA=1 = 1) = expit(α0 + αA). As
for {M = 1}, we have
{M = 1} = {εM ≤ expit(α0 + αAA)}
= ({εM ≤ expit(α0 + αA)} ∩ {εA ≤ pA}) ∪ ({εM ≤ expit(α0)} ∩ {εA > pA}),
so that P (M = 1 = 1) = pAexpit(α0 +αA) + (1− pA)expit(α0). Therefore, {M =
1} 6= {MA=0 = 1}, {M = 1} 6= {MA=1 = 1} and {MA=0 = 1} 6= {MA=0 = 1}
as soon as αA 6= 0 in this simplified setting.
6.2 Derivation of ∆CE under our generative model
An analytic formula for E(Y A=a|M = 1) = P (Y A=a = 1|M = 1) can be de-
rived from basic probability calculus under the data generation mechanism described
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in Section 4. For simplicity, we assume that pA = pU = 1/2. First,
P (Y A=a = 1|M = 1)
=
∑
iA∈{0,1}
iU∈{0,1}
P (Y A=a = 1|M = 1, A = iA, U = iU )P (A = iA, U = iU |M = 1)
=
∑
iA∈{0,1}
iU∈{0,1}
P (Y A=a = 1,M = 1|A = iA, U = iU )P (A = iA, U = iU |M = 1)
P (M = 1|A = iA, U = iU )
(∗)
=
∑
iA∈{0,1}
iU∈{0,1}
∫ pM (iA,iU )
0
P (Y A=a = 1|εM = ε,A = iA, U = iU )
4P (M = 1)
dε
=
∑
iA∈{0,1}
iU∈{0,1}
∫ pM (iA,iU )
0
P (εY ≤ pY (a,MA=a, U)|εM = ε,A = iA, U = iU )
4P (M = 1)
dε
where we use the fact that the conditional density of εM given (A = iA, U = iU )
uniformly equals 1 over the interval [0, 1] to establish equality (∗). Then, successively
using the fact that (i) MA=a = 1I[εM ≤ pM (a, U)], and (ii) P (εY ≤ ρ) = ρ for any
ρ ∈ [0, 1], it follows that
P (Y A=a = 1|M = 1)
=
∑
iA∈{0,1}
iU∈{0,1}
∫ [pM (iA,iU )∧pM (a,iU )]
0
P (εY ≤ pY (a, 1, iU ))dε+
∫ pM (iA,iU )
[pM (iA,iU )∧pM (a,iU )] pY (a, 0, iU )dε
4P (M = 1)
=
∑
iA∈{0,1}
iU∈{0,1}
pY (a, 1, iU )[pM (iA, iU ) ∧ pM (a, iU )] + pY (a, 0, iU ){pM (iA, iU )− [pM (iA, iU ) ∧ pM (a, iU )]}
4P (M = 1)
Because P (M = 1) =
∑
iA,iU
pM (iA, iU )/4, it is straightforward to compute
P (Y A=a = 1|M = 1), hence ∆CE , for any combinations of values for the parameters
α0, αA, αU , αAU , β0, βA, βU , βM , βAM , βAU , βUM and βAUM .
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